Off Topic The Politics Thread

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Should the UK remain a part of the EU or leave?

  • Stay in

    Votes: 56 47.9%

  • Get out

    Votes: 61 52.1%
  • Total voters
    117
  • Poll closed .
Steelmonkey said:
Had a booze fueled discussion with a colleague last night, and we decided that Trump was playing the markets with his Greenland threats, waiting for the stocks to fall to a low then getting all his pals to buy, buy, buy, then announce a Starmer style U-Turn and see the markets flourish and his cronies sell, sell sell and make billions - probably. What a tango-faced **** he is.
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He may have done that in the past with tariffs, but I'm not sure it applies here. His Greenland climbdown is a humiliation for him and he likes to think of himself as a winner. I think the strength of the reactions from European leaders, and from Carney, took him by surprise and that the resulting stock market falls in the US indicated to him and his advisors just how disastrous for the dollar, and the US economy as a whole, any invasion of Greenland would be. I also have a feeling that some senior people in the US military might have made it clear that if US forces were to be put in a position where they could be asked to fight the forces of fellow NATO members, they would refuse.

Of course he then went on to say that he didn't believe the rest of NATO would defend the US if it was attacked, which is ironic considering that the only time Article 5 has been invoked it was by the USA, and NATO members did indeed respond. His comments about non-US NATO forces holding back from the front line in Afghanistan were particularly disgusting, don't you think?
 
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Stroller said:
He may have done that in the past with tariffs, but I'm not sure it applies here. His Greenland climbdown is a humiliation for him and he likes to think of himself as a winner. I think the strength of the reactions from European leaders, and from Carney, took him by surprise and that the resulting stock market falls in the US indicated to him and his advisors just how disastrous for the dollar, and the US economy as a whole, any invasion of Greenland would be. I also have a feeling that some senior people in the US military might have made it clear that if US forces were to be put in a position where they could be asked to fight the forces of fellow NATO members, they would refuse.

Of course he then went on to say that he didn't believe the rest of NATO would defend the US if it was attacked, which is ironic considering that the only time Article 5 has been invoked it was by the USA, and NATO members did indeed respond. His comments about non-US NATO forces holding back from the front line in Afghanistan were particularly disgusting, don't you think?
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Fair play to Starmer for calling Trump out on that, 457 killed and hundreds maimed for life fighting alongside and separate from US forces. Trump proving what a unique c*nt he really is...
 
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Stroller said:
He may have done that in the past with tariffs, but I'm not sure it applies here. His Greenland climbdown is a humiliation for him and he likes to think of himself as a winner. I think the strength of the reactions from European leaders, and from Carney, took him by surprise and that the resulting stock market falls in the US indicated to him and his advisors just how disastrous for the dollar, and the US economy as a whole, any invasion of Greenland would be. I also have a feeling that some senior people in the US military might have made it clear that if US forces were to be put in a position where they could be asked to fight the forces of fellow NATO members, they would refuse.

Of course he then went on to say that he didn't believe the rest of NATO would defend the US if it was attacked, which is ironic considering that the only time Article 5 has been invoked it was by the USA, and NATO members did indeed respond. His comments about non-US NATO forces holding back from the front line in Afghanistan were particularly disgusting, don't you think?
Click to expand...

Totally out of order with what he said. There were thousands of US troops based in Bagrahm Airfield, as REMF* a post as you could get in Afghanistan but you don't hear Trump calling them out for shirking away from the front line.

Many British, Canadian, Danish and other NATO forces served right on the front line in Helmand and Kandahar, with an atrition rate probably at the same levels as those experienced by the US.

Trump is just showing himself up on the world stage once more. The man can't help himself, just lets his mouth run at 100mph and to hell with the consequences.


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The US Marine Corps Captain that was saved by Lance Corporal Joshua Leakey should tell Trump what he thinks of his comments. Leakey was awarded the Victoria Cross for his heroism. The official VC citation reads as follows:
Between May and December 2013, Lance Corporal Leakey was deployed in Afghanistan as a member of a Task Force conducting operations to disrupt insurgent safe-havens and protect the main operating base in Helmand province. The majority of operations took place in daylight in non-permissive areas, attracting significant risk. On the 22nd August 2013, Lance Corporal Leakey deployed on a combined UK / US assault led by the United States Marine Corps into a Taliban stronghold to disrupt a key insurgent group.
After dismounting from their helicopters, the force came under accurate machine gun and rocket propelled grenades fire resulting in the Command Group being pinned down on the exposed forward slope of a hill. The team attempted to extract from the killing zone for an hour, their efforts resulting in a Marine Corps Captain being shot and wounded and their communications being put out of action. Lance Corporal Leakey, positioned on the lee of the hill, realising the seriousness of the situation and with complete disregard for his own safety, dashed across a large area of barren hillside which was now being raked with machine gun fire. As he crested the hill, the full severity of the situation became apparent: approximately twenty enemy had surrounded two friendly machine gun teams and a mortar section rendering their critical fire support ineffective.
Undeterred by the very clear and present danger, Lance Corporal Leakey moved down the forward slope of the hill, and gave first aid to the wounded officer. Despite being the most junior commander in the area, Lance Corporal Leakey took control of the situation and initiated the casualty evacuation. Realising that the initiative was still in the hands of the enemy, he set off back up the hill, still under enemy fire, to get one of the suppressed machine guns into action. On reaching it, and with rounds impacting on the frame of the gun itself, he moved it to another position and began engaging the enemy.
This courageous action spurred those around him back into the fight; nonetheless, the weight of enemy fire continued. For the third time and with full knowledge of the extant dangers, Lance Corporal Leakey exposed himself to enemy fire once more. Weighed down by over 60 lbs of equipment, he ran to the bottom of the hill, picked up the second machine gun and climbed back up the hill again: a round trip of more than 200 metres on steep terrain. Drawing the majority of the enemy fire, with rounds splashing around him, Lance Corporal Leakey overcame his fatigue to re-site the gun and return fire. This proved to be the turning point. Inspired by Lance Corporal Leakey's actions, and with a heavy weight of fire now at their disposal, the force began to fight back with renewed ferocity.
Having regained the initiative, Lance Corporal Leakey handed over the machine gun and led the extraction of the wounded officer to a point from which he could be safely evacuated. During the assault 11 insurgents were killed and 4 wounded, but the weight of enemy fire had effectively pinned down the command team.
Displaying gritty leadership well above that expected of his rank, Lance Corporal Leakey's actions single-handedly regained the initiative and prevented considerable loss of life, allowing a wounded US Marine officer to be evacuated. For this act of valour, Lance Corporal Leakey is highly deserving of significant national recognition.
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Stroller said:
Reflecting on recent events and how Brexit has affected the UK's part in them, I thought I'd search out a post I made on here back in 2016. I found this...

I voted Stay on here and will do so on June 23rd also. My reasons are more geopolitical than domestic - I believe a strong and united Europe is more necessary now than ever. With Putin becoming more and more belligerent and the terrifying possibility of a Trump presidency in the US, Europe is needed as a moderating influence and I believe Britain should play a full part in Europe instead of acting like a US mini-me.

Seems to me I've been proved right. The US is no ally of the UK, or of Europe. There's often talk of three World superpowers - why should Russia be considered one of them? With a GDP twelve times that of Russia, a strong and united Europe could be way more powerful than Russia and has now shown that Trump's craziness can relatively easily be rebuffed. Europe should be the third superpower and the UK should be a full part of it.

**** the USA.
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For the voracity of his now famous Davos speech, Canadian PM, Mark Carney (who departed prior to Trump's venomous response), has now been "dis-invited" from joining the Gaza Board of Peace, a shake down of a motley crew of 35 nations for a billion dollars apiece with no European nations accepting.
 
Uk having a bob each way

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News|Sudan war

Is the UK playing a double game in Sudan and Somalia?​

Critics say it’s enabling violence in Sudan. And while backing Somalia’s unity, it is doing business with Somaliland. The result: The UK is increasingly seen as an amplifier of the Horn of Africa’s crises.

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Workers offload goods from a docked ship at the seaport of Berbera in Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, Thursday, February 10, 2022 [Brian Inganga/ AP Photo]
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ByIndlieb Farazi Saber
Published On 23 Jan 202623 Jan 2026
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In December, as it often has during the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the British government urged accountability, expressing concerns about the mass-scale death and devastation that civilians have suffered.

But reporting has shown that, behind the scenes, the United Kingdom rejected more ambitious plans to prevent atrocities as violence escalated.

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Jagan Chapagain on aid cuts, Sudan and a fracturing humanitarian system​

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Tracking Sudan’s humanitarian crisis: By the numbers​

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Sudan paramilitary declares rival government two years into civil war​

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Further east, the UK has officially backed the territorial integrity of Somalia – while holding a stake in a strategic port in the breakaway region of Somaliland that it does not recognise.

These decisions and moves by the UK, say analysts, raise doubts about whether its words are in keeping with its actions in the Horn of Africa.

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, a Sudanese policy analyst, said the UK’s credibility is increasingly judged by the risks it is willing, or unwilling, to take.

“When people believe your words and your actions diverge, they stop treating you as a broker and start treating you as an interest manager,” he told Al Jazeera.

‘Enabler of aggression’ in Sudan​

That judgement, analysts argue, now colours how the UK’s actions elsewhere in the region are being read.

In Sudan, earlier reports show how the UK government opted for what internal documents describe as the “least ambitious” approach to end the bloodshed, even as mass killings by the RSF mounted in Darfur, including around el-Fasher.

Eltayeb argues that this has led the UK to be viewed not as a marginal or distracted actor, but as a central one whose diplomatic posture has helped shape how the war is framed internationally.

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He referred to reports that the United Arab Emirates has armed or supported RSF – allegations documented by UN experts and international media and denied by Abu Dhabi – and said the UK had emerged as “an enabler of the Emirati aggression in Sudan”. The aim: To “whitewash RSF atrocities in the diplomatic framing of the war”.

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Asked about its approach to Sudan, the UK Foreign Office told Al Jazeera: “The crisis in Sudan is the worst we have seen in decades – the UK government is working with allies and partners to end the violence and prevent further atrocities from occurring.

“We need both the parties to support a ceasefire; this means unrestricted humanitarian access and a peace process with transition to a civilian government.”

Recognise Somalia, do business with Somaliland​

The Foreign Office did not respond to questions about the UK’s role in Somalia or its commercial engagement in Somaliland, where scrutiny has increasingly centred on the port of Berbera.

The British government co-owns the port through its development finance arm, British International Investment (BII). The port is jointly owned by the UAE-based logistics firm DP World and the government of Somaliland – even though the UK does not officially recognise that government. The UAE, too, formally does not recognise Somaliland.

Berbera sits near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. An impact assessment commissioned by the UK Foreign Office described it as “a strategic gateway” to Somaliland and a potential alternative trade corridor for Ethiopia, language that places it firmly within the region’s geopolitical architecture.

The port’s strategic value is not new. Matthew Benson-Strohmayer, a social and economic historian of Africa at the London School of Economics (LSE), noted that Berbera has repeatedly been treated by external powers as strategic infrastructure first, and a political community second. It has served at different points as a British coaling station, a Soviet naval base during the Cold War, and now a commercial logistics hub shaped by Gulf and Western interests.

The Sudan-Somaliland link​

That wider architecture has become more politically charged as Sudan’s war has spilled across borders.

Observers have suggested that Berbera is part of a broader Emirati logistics network that United Nations experts and international media have linked to alleged supply routes used to arm the RSF. The UAE has consistently denied these allegations.

For critics, the UK’s commercial entanglement with that alleged network raises uncomfortable questions. While London publicly calls for accountability in Sudan, it remains financially tied, via the BII, to a port operated by the UAE, a close regional partner accused of backing one side in the war next door.

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Abdalftah Hamed Ali, an independent Horn of Africa analyst, said this highlights what many critics see as “a gap between principle and practice”.

“Even if London disputes those linkages,” he said, “the perception problem remains.”

The sensitivity has deepened as Somaliland’s political status has returned to the diplomatic spotlight. Last month, Israel became the only country to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence, a move condemned by Mogadishu and rejected by the wider international community.

For analysts, these developments underscore why claims that economic engagement can be kept separate from politics are increasingly difficult to sustain.

Ali said Berbera cannot be treated as a neutral commercial asset.

“Ports in the region are not just economic assets; they are nodes in a security and influence ecosystem,” he said. “When investment touches ports, free zones, and long-term trade access, it becomes politically legible. People interpret it as strengthening one authority’s bargaining position, whether that is the intention or not.”

In Somaliland’s case, that political legibility cuts several ways: Reinforcing its de facto autonomy, reshaping regional alliances, and entangling external actors, the UK included, in a dispute London – officially – says should be resolved through dialogue rather than external alignment.

Ali described the UK’s approach as a “dual-track” policy.

“Britain maintains its formal diplomatic line with the recognised Somali state, but it also works with Somaliland as a de facto authority because it is stable and functions and controls territory,” he said.

LSE’s Benson-Strohmayer explained that after declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland was excluded from international recognition and large-scale foreign aid. Early governments were forced to rely on locally raised revenue, particularly taxation linked to Berbera port, a dependence that gave domestic actors leverage to demand representation and accountability.

In 1992, when a transitional government attempted to seize control of Berbera by force, local clan authorities resisted. The standoff ended in compromise, helping to entrench Somaliland’s power-sharing system.

Benson-Strohmayer, who also serves as Sudan Research Director at LSE, described this dynamic as a “revenue complex”, in which fiscal control and political legitimacy are tightly intertwined.

Large external infrastructure investments, he warned, risk undermining that bargain.

“When states can finance themselves through deals with external investors rather than negotiations with local constituencies, the fiscal contract changes,” Benson-Strohmayer said.

Such projects, he added, reconfigure who controls revenue flows, who benefits from the port economy, and who gains political leverage. In territories with unresolved political status, infrastructure investment can enable what he described as “governance through commercial presence” – allowing external actors to extract strategic value while avoiding explicit political responsibility.





















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Ambiguity by choice​

The UK’s position, Benson-Strohmayer argued, exemplifies this ambiguity.

British formal support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, paired with deepening commercial and security engagement with Somaliland, he said, gives it port access, counterterrorism cooperation and commercial returns, while avoiding the political costs of a clear position.

Over time, this can undermine institutional consolidation on both sides: Allowing Mogadishu to avoid meaningful negotiations over Somaliland’s status, while weakening Somaliland’s domestic accountability mechanisms by bypassing local political bargaining.

The UK’s posture in Somaliland has drawn scrutiny before. In 2023, Declassified UK reported that the British government suppressed the release of a report into the killing of civilians during clashes in Somaliland, a decision critics then said prioritised political relationships over transparency and accountability. British officials said at the time that decisions around the report were taken in line with diplomatic and security considerations.

Read together, analysts say the UK’s decisions in Sudan and Somalia reflect a single approach applied in different contexts: Preserving access and partnerships while avoiding moves – diplomatic pressure, public confrontation or policy shifts – that would narrow its room for manoeuvre.

Ali argued that while this approach may secure short-term influence, it carries longer-term costs, particularly in a region as politically entangled as the Horn of Africa.

“In the Horn, where alliances overlap with regional rivalries and the conflict economy, mixed signals can quickly become a liability,” he said. “You lose the moral authority to press for political compromise if local actors think your incentives lie elsewhere.”
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kiwiqpr said:
Uk having a bob each way

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News|Sudan war

Is the UK playing a double game in Sudan and Somalia?​

Critics say it’s enabling violence in Sudan. And while backing Somalia’s unity, it is doing business with Somaliland. The result: The UK is increasingly seen as an amplifier of the Horn of Africa’s crises.

You must log in or register to see images

Workers offload goods from a docked ship at the seaport of Berbera in Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, Thursday, February 10, 2022 [Brian Inganga/ AP Photo]
You must log in or register to see images

ByIndlieb Farazi Saber
Published On 23 Jan 202623 Jan 2026
Click here to share on social media
Share

Save
In December, as it often has during the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the British government urged accountability, expressing concerns about the mass-scale death and devastation that civilians have suffered.

But reporting has shown that, behind the scenes, the United Kingdom rejected more ambitious plans to prevent atrocities as violence escalated.

Recommended Stories​


list of 4 itemslist 1 of 4

Jagan Chapagain on aid cuts, Sudan and a fracturing humanitarian system​

list 2 of 4

Animated maps show two years of war in Sudan​

list 3 of 4

Tracking Sudan’s humanitarian crisis: By the numbers​

list 4 of 4

Sudan paramilitary declares rival government two years into civil war​

end of list
Further east, the UK has officially backed the territorial integrity of Somalia – while holding a stake in a strategic port in the breakaway region of Somaliland that it does not recognise.

These decisions and moves by the UK, say analysts, raise doubts about whether its words are in keeping with its actions in the Horn of Africa.

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, a Sudanese policy analyst, said the UK’s credibility is increasingly judged by the risks it is willing, or unwilling, to take.

“When people believe your words and your actions diverge, they stop treating you as a broker and start treating you as an interest manager,” he told Al Jazeera.

‘Enabler of aggression’ in Sudan​

That judgement, analysts argue, now colours how the UK’s actions elsewhere in the region are being read.

In Sudan, earlier reports show how the UK government opted for what internal documents describe as the “least ambitious” approach to end the bloodshed, even as mass killings by the RSF mounted in Darfur, including around el-Fasher.

Eltayeb argues that this has led the UK to be viewed not as a marginal or distracted actor, but as a central one whose diplomatic posture has helped shape how the war is framed internationally.

Advertisement

He referred to reports that the United Arab Emirates has armed or supported RSF – allegations documented by UN experts and international media and denied by Abu Dhabi – and said the UK had emerged as “an enabler of the Emirati aggression in Sudan”. The aim: To “whitewash RSF atrocities in the diplomatic framing of the war”.

Get instant alerts and updates based on your interests. Be the first to know when big stories happen.
Yes, keep me updated
Asked about its approach to Sudan, the UK Foreign Office told Al Jazeera: “The crisis in Sudan is the worst we have seen in decades – the UK government is working with allies and partners to end the violence and prevent further atrocities from occurring.

“We need both the parties to support a ceasefire; this means unrestricted humanitarian access and a peace process with transition to a civilian government.”

Recognise Somalia, do business with Somaliland​

The Foreign Office did not respond to questions about the UK’s role in Somalia or its commercial engagement in Somaliland, where scrutiny has increasingly centred on the port of Berbera.

The British government co-owns the port through its development finance arm, British International Investment (BII). The port is jointly owned by the UAE-based logistics firm DP World and the government of Somaliland – even though the UK does not officially recognise that government. The UAE, too, formally does not recognise Somaliland.

Berbera sits near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. An impact assessment commissioned by the UK Foreign Office described it as “a strategic gateway” to Somaliland and a potential alternative trade corridor for Ethiopia, language that places it firmly within the region’s geopolitical architecture.

The port’s strategic value is not new. Matthew Benson-Strohmayer, a social and economic historian of Africa at the London School of Economics (LSE), noted that Berbera has repeatedly been treated by external powers as strategic infrastructure first, and a political community second. It has served at different points as a British coaling station, a Soviet naval base during the Cold War, and now a commercial logistics hub shaped by Gulf and Western interests.

The Sudan-Somaliland link​

That wider architecture has become more politically charged as Sudan’s war has spilled across borders.

Observers have suggested that Berbera is part of a broader Emirati logistics network that United Nations experts and international media have linked to alleged supply routes used to arm the RSF. The UAE has consistently denied these allegations.

For critics, the UK’s commercial entanglement with that alleged network raises uncomfortable questions. While London publicly calls for accountability in Sudan, it remains financially tied, via the BII, to a port operated by the UAE, a close regional partner accused of backing one side in the war next door.

Advertisement

Abdalftah Hamed Ali, an independent Horn of Africa analyst, said this highlights what many critics see as “a gap between principle and practice”.

“Even if London disputes those linkages,” he said, “the perception problem remains.”

The sensitivity has deepened as Somaliland’s political status has returned to the diplomatic spotlight. Last month, Israel became the only country to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence, a move condemned by Mogadishu and rejected by the wider international community.

For analysts, these developments underscore why claims that economic engagement can be kept separate from politics are increasingly difficult to sustain.

Ali said Berbera cannot be treated as a neutral commercial asset.

“Ports in the region are not just economic assets; they are nodes in a security and influence ecosystem,” he said. “When investment touches ports, free zones, and long-term trade access, it becomes politically legible. People interpret it as strengthening one authority’s bargaining position, whether that is the intention or not.”

In Somaliland’s case, that political legibility cuts several ways: Reinforcing its de facto autonomy, reshaping regional alliances, and entangling external actors, the UK included, in a dispute London – officially – says should be resolved through dialogue rather than external alignment.

Ali described the UK’s approach as a “dual-track” policy.

“Britain maintains its formal diplomatic line with the recognised Somali state, but it also works with Somaliland as a de facto authority because it is stable and functions and controls territory,” he said.

LSE’s Benson-Strohmayer explained that after declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland was excluded from international recognition and large-scale foreign aid. Early governments were forced to rely on locally raised revenue, particularly taxation linked to Berbera port, a dependence that gave domestic actors leverage to demand representation and accountability.

In 1992, when a transitional government attempted to seize control of Berbera by force, local clan authorities resisted. The standoff ended in compromise, helping to entrench Somaliland’s power-sharing system.

Benson-Strohmayer, who also serves as Sudan Research Director at LSE, described this dynamic as a “revenue complex”, in which fiscal control and political legitimacy are tightly intertwined.

Large external infrastructure investments, he warned, risk undermining that bargain.

“When states can finance themselves through deals with external investors rather than negotiations with local constituencies, the fiscal contract changes,” Benson-Strohmayer said.

Such projects, he added, reconfigure who controls revenue flows, who benefits from the port economy, and who gains political leverage. In territories with unresolved political status, infrastructure investment can enable what he described as “governance through commercial presence” – allowing external actors to extract strategic value while avoiding explicit political responsibility.





















You must log in or register to see images


Read More


00:00






03:12






Ambiguity by choice​

The UK’s position, Benson-Strohmayer argued, exemplifies this ambiguity.

British formal support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, paired with deepening commercial and security engagement with Somaliland, he said, gives it port access, counterterrorism cooperation and commercial returns, while avoiding the political costs of a clear position.

Over time, this can undermine institutional consolidation on both sides: Allowing Mogadishu to avoid meaningful negotiations over Somaliland’s status, while weakening Somaliland’s domestic accountability mechanisms by bypassing local political bargaining.

The UK’s posture in Somaliland has drawn scrutiny before. In 2023, Declassified UK reported that the British government suppressed the release of a report into the killing of civilians during clashes in Somaliland, a decision critics then said prioritised political relationships over transparency and accountability. British officials said at the time that decisions around the report were taken in line with diplomatic and security considerations.

Read together, analysts say the UK’s decisions in Sudan and Somalia reflect a single approach applied in different contexts: Preserving access and partnerships while avoiding moves – diplomatic pressure, public confrontation or policy shifts – that would narrow its room for manoeuvre.

Ali argued that while this approach may secure short-term influence, it carries longer-term costs, particularly in a region as politically entangled as the Horn of Africa.

“In the Horn, where alliances overlap with regional rivalries and the conflict economy, mixed signals can quickly become a liability,” he said. “You lose the moral authority to press for political compromise if local actors think your incentives lie elsewhere.”
Advertisement

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play media 0

From: The Inside Story PodcastWhat's the significance of Israel recognising Somaliland?Israel has become the first country to recognise Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia. That's angered Mogadishu, as...
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play media 1

From: The Inside Story PodcastHas the fight against Al-Shabab failed?UN experts say the group remains a major threat to stability in Somalia and neighbouring countries.And it is still able to...
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From: The TakeWhat does Israel’s recognition of Somaliland mean for the region?Israel has become the first country in the world to recognize the breakaway region of Somaliland since it declared indepen...

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Not reading all of that obviously but we should stay well out of both. At worst send Lammy to sit in a few meetings.
 
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Maybe Trump should see how good some of his forces are versus NATO Arctic warfare experts...

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Steelmonkey said:
Maybe Trump should see how good some of his forces are versus NATO Arctic warfare experts...

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I read the Finns are experts in Arctic warfare and have been on high alert for years due to Putin's threats. They're no pushover in familiar conditions...
 
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Steelmonkey said:
Maybe Trump should see how good some of his forces are versus NATO Arctic warfare experts...

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Sooperhoop said:
I read the Finns are experts in Arctic warfare and have been on high alert for years due to Putin's threats. They're no pushover in familiar conditions...
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I suspect that if Putin took on NATO with conventional forces the Finns and the Poles (who have seriously tooled up recently) would see him off. Until he gets his nukes out.
 
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