On reflection, I am in Dev's corner. Anyone who calls their children Verity and Linus must be a sex fiend and if they're not they should be bloody well treated as such.
These historic celebrity sex crime cases are a cunning diversion. Your attention is being deliberately turned away from the mass rape, and in some instances, the murder and rape of white girls by moslems. The person whose decision it is to bring these cases to court is a moslem himself, although he is not solely to blame, the establishment are also trying to divert your attention away from their failed multi-culti experiment. White men rape women too. What better way to prove it to the masses of sheeple who only watch Coronation Street etc than to prosecute a load of celebrities? To add further to their disgraceful behaviour, the establishment are on one hand persecuting straight men for allegedly touching up a few young tarts decades ago. On the other hand they are destroying the criminal records of homosexuals convicted of lewd behaviour. You couldn't make it up!
In Scotland the evidence from the two women (which was thrown out for having not enough evidence to support them) would probably not have been dropped. That's not to say that he would have been found guilty but the weight of evidence against him would have made it more likely. This explains it: The Moorov doctrine is a mechanism which applies where a person is accused of two or more separate offences, connected in time and circumstances. In such a case, where each of the offences charged is spoken to by a single credible witness, that evidence may corroborate, and be corroborated by, the other single witnesses, so as to enable the conviction of the accused on all the charges. In order for the doctrine to operate, each of the offences must be competently charged. It is not possible to rely for corroboration of a charge upon evidence of conduct, however similar, in respect of which the accused has previously been convicted or acquitted. The operation of the doctrine involves similar issues to cases of similar fact evidence, since it permits evidence relating to one alleged crime to be used in support of a charge relating to a separate incident. We have considered the origins and present state of the doctrine, and whether any reform is required. In particular, we have considered whether it would be appropriate, as part of a wider reform of the law of similar fact evidence, to allow corroboration to be found in evidence of similar offences which cannot be tried on the same indictment, such as, for example, offences in relation to which the accused has already been tried and acquitted or convicted.
