Thanks very much for your response, Treble. You raise a number of really important points which I am happy to give my perspective on. As I stressed earlier, I try as hard as I can to make 'observations' only. I apologise if any indirect bias comes across in those points, it is not my intention. A big part of my training in my years there was to focus on 'possible/impossible' rather than 'right/wrong'. It is
really painful to have to do that, but it does help to re-frame the debate and keep it forward-thinking rather than stuck in the same circular, stale arguments we've all heard a thousand times over.
1)
The Sheikh Jarrah Case
I think you might have read too much into my comments here, but I've probably done you a disservice by conflating two threads of discussion.
- The first is instances of Israel evicting Palestinian residents of East J'lem with no reason to do so. I fully disagree with and condemn this if and when it happens.
- I was commenting specifically on the Sheikh Jarrah case in isolation, as it is acknowledged as the chief 'trigger' behind the current flare up. The eviction of 6 Palestinian families from their homes in the neighbourhood was done off the back of a law that is without question discriminatory at first glance. The Israeli citizens set to move back in to those homes had clear, court-verified proof that they had owned that land prior to being evicted by Jordan in 1948. Israeli law recognises that proof. Why does it not recognise similar proof when brought by Palestinian residents of Israel 'proper' pre-1948? The answer to this question has two components. Firstly: that the global Palestinian expat population (i.e. people who could potentially file such claims) has grown to appx. the same size as Israel's entire population since 1948. Secondly, that similar legal representation has historically been denied Jewish citizens similarly evicted from Arab countries in 1948. Again - I don't agree with Israel's position on this and would gladly welcome a 'quota' system whereby at least a percentage of Palestinian expats could file claims and have them upheld.
- Agreed, the watchtower is a serious eyesore and totally unnecessary. However, it was built in 2018 iirc, so not necessarily clear that it is directly connected to a flare-up 3 years later.
- The Jerusalem Day march is indeed a provocation but (sadly) totally legal by every western measure of the right to gather and demonstrate (if done peacefully). Unless I am mistaken, the march this year was diverted away from its normal route to prevent further provocation. I know the NGO I worked for was lobbying heavily for this diversion to happen and I hope it did. I also hope the route stays 'diverted' in future years.
- East Jerusalem is a major sticking point. I disagree strongly with Israel's insistence on a 'united capital' when it is clear that the city is totally divided. And there is nothing much wrong with that. A lasting solution would almost certainly require an Israeli capital in West Jerusalem and a Palestinian one in East Jerusalem, so Israel should start adjusting to that reality sooner rather than later.
2) Israeli/Palestinian Leadership
- We seem to be in agreement on most points here. Being that it is that Fatah is totally inept and corrupt, while Hamas in word and deed is committed to the destruction of Israel, it seems unlikely that the executive branches as they exist today would get around a table to negotiate. Netanyahu is personally too right-wing and too far in the pockets of parties even further to the right, anything Fatah promises will carry as much trust as a damp tissue, whilst anything Hamas says will be seen as subterfuge or a deliberate game of smoke and mirrors. There is a real vacuum of strong, reliable leaders across the entire region right now. If and when the Palestinian elections ever take place, Israel may need to do the unthinkable and commute Marwan Barghouti's prison sentence. He is one of the few people alive who both Gazans and West Bankers would rally around. He is also tough enough to stand up to Netanyahu.
- I think your point about Israel changing its constitution is factually incorrect. iirc, in 1988 the Kenesset raised the electoral threshold from 1% to 1.5% precisely to prevent smaller parties holding disproportionate sway. This decision was crucial in paving the way for the Oslo Accords to clear the Israeli legislature as the 1992 election saw numerous small right-wing parties drop out of the Kenesset entirely, allowing Rabin to build a coalition made up of just 3 parties. Israel has since then raised the threshold to 3.25%, as well as removing the clause allowing the PM to be elected directly, all in a bid to return more stable governments and prevent fringe parties from having too much of a say. This clearly isn't working anymore and debate is raging in Israel at the moment as to how much this has to do with Netanyahu personally and how much it has to do with the fact that politics has polarised globally and QED further electoral reform is needed (either increasing the threshold to 5% or introducing elements of FPTP).
3) The Palestinian Position
- I think this is probably the bit we are furthest apart on. I cannot agree with how casually you deal with the Hamas question. Brushing something aside as a 'go-to rhetoric' when every measurable evidence - in word and in deed - points to the fact that it isn't just rhetoric, is not a sensible position to take and certainly not one a single Israeli beyond perhaps the most ardently left-wing will take seriously. You do the same Re the Iranian threat and - forgive me for slipping into a 'judgement' here - it would seem that you cherry pick which threats to take seriously and which to dismiss as mere bluster. As above, I try to focus on 'possible/impossible', and until Hamas fundamentally changes its raison d'etre, negotiation with it as an entity is as close to impossible as you can get. The fact that it is a grassroots organisation (still highly corrupt btw) that cares for welfare and aid is strictly an internal Palestinian issue that cannot and should not bear any relevance to Israel's opinion.
- Hamas did not adopt a 'wait and see' approach to Oslo. It rejected Oslo three times. Most recently in 2017.
- Hamas' 2017 Charter does indeed include a section that looks like it approves of a two-state solution. Here is that clause in full. I ask you to read it and guess what the average Israeli thinks of Hamas' commitment to that solution:
"Hamas believes that no part of the land of Palestine shall be compromised or conceded, irrespective of the causes, the circumstances and the pressures and no matter how long the occupation lasts. Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus."
- Israeli suspicion of Hamas' motives in their 2017 Charter are buttressed by internal speeches and interviews (its co-founder Mahmoud Al-Zahar tends to be the most inflammatory in this regard) which suggest that its embrace of the 1967 borders are merely a ruse and a preliminary step toward the eventual liberation of the entire region and Israel's destruction.
4) The Two-State Solution
- A contiguous link between Gaza and the W Bank is the only way a two-state solution doesn't become a three-state solution. It is crucial by every moral and political measure that the Palestinians of Gaza are able to access their kin in the West Bank, and vice-versa. As you can see on the map you've provided, the only way to do this is to construct a road straight across Israel proper. There is a surprising level of support for this among grassroots Israelis despite the fact that it is a logistical nightmare, but categorically
not if one end of the road (or both, if Hamas wins the elections in the West Bank) is controlled by a movement sworn to its destruction.
- Yes, Hamas terrifies me more than Israel does. When all is said and done, Israel is a democracy. It is a democracy whose electorate is steadily growing sick of Netanyahu and his generation of politician and is pushing louder with each failed election for real and lasting reform. Hamas masquerades under the illusion of democracy. I was on the ground during the civil war and elections in 2006/7 and it was painfully obvious that Hamas was strong-arming its way into office via forged ballots and voter intimidation. Since then, it has been accountable and answerable to no-one and cannot, unlike Netanyahu, be removed from power internally unless fair and transparent voting is guaranteed.
- The article you've cited Re Hamas' failure to construct bomb shelters made me grimace. It seems to be suggesting that since concrete is a scarce commodity (which it is, due to blockades - agreed), what little they have is best served in creating tunnels from which they can attack Israel? And secondly, that as it is so expensive to protect
all 1.5 million people, it is better not to protect any at all? I hope you see how perverse that reasoning is.
- So yes, in conclusion to all of the above, second only to Israel, the greatest enemies of the Palestinian people are their own leaders. Fatah for their impotence and corruption, and Hamas for their total disregard of the peace process at every demonstrable level, using their civilian population in a lethal game of cat and mouse.
- Re the Gaza/Manhattan comparison, I certainly didn't mean it as flippantly or as broadly as you have deduced. I agree, the situation in Gaza from a humanitarian perspective is horrendous and I feel only sympathy for the innocent people trapped in that hell hole. To my mind, the only feasible way forward is a new generation of leaders across the board, the international community (especially the Gulf States who have done feck all to help in 50 years) massively stepping up its overseeing a new peace process with a fresh impetus, as well as massive economic investment in the Palestinian territories (the one thing Trump got right imo, he recognised that increased prosperity and opportunity is key to unlocking a willing young generation pushing for peace).
Thanks again for your comments and ideas