I don't think there's anything against small Countries in particular mate. When these tournaments come round there's disparagement against every bloody Country! There's two culprits in particular who I nicknamed "Churchill's pups" after their antics during the Euros (Their latest target was the "Eyeties") The French and the Germans in particular got a right roasting that time round but its not as bad this time. Munich retaliated on the matchday thread the other night with some needless sneering at England's defeat. He was out of order and let himself down even though I did see the provocation. To be fair to the fellas, QPR are an English Club so they're entitled to lay into other Countries on their own Site and its not sinister in any way. They're not even aware if it actually. Go onto a Site based in any other Country and you'd find the same type of jingoism or worse.
I'm not offended, but I bet Alex salmond was disappointed. A good England performance even a miracle win, would have probably pushed them to vote Yes in his referendum. In fact it's quite sweet that he still cares about our results long after most sensible English people gave up caring. Did I also read that he lives in Northampton?
They drove the Italian tanks, three reverse gears and one forward gear in case the enemy attack from behind!...
Zealous nationalists are easily duped with propaganda that suits their narrow narrative: Controversies of historiography Allied press reports of Italian military prowess in the Second World War were almost always dismissive. British wartime propaganda trumpeted the destruction of the Italian 10th Army by a significantly smaller British force during the early phase of the North African Campaign.[75][76] The propaganda from this Italian collapse, which was designed to boost British morale during a bleak period of the war,[77] left a lasting impression. The later exploits of Rommel and German accounts of events tended to disparage their Italian allies and downplay their contributions; these German accounts were used as a primary source for the Axis side by English-language historians after the war.[78][79] Kenneth Macksey wrote in 1972 that after the split in the Italian state and the reinforcement of fascist Italy by German troops, "the British threw out the Italian Chicken only to let in the German Eagle", for example.[80][nb 11] Some more recent scholars have attempted to reassess the performance of the Italian forces, notably James Sadkovich, Peter Haining, Vincent O'Hara, and Ian Walker. Contemporary British reports ignored an action of Bir El Gobi where a battalion of Giovani Fascisti held up the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade and destroyed dozens of tanks of the 22nd Armoured,[83] and Sadkovich,[84] Walker,[85] and others[86] have found numerous other examples of actions where Italian forces performed strongly, yet are rarely discussed by most histories. During the Tunisian Campaign, where Italian units were involved in most encounters, such as Kasserine Pass, Mareth, Akarit and Enfidaville, it was observed by General Alexander, "...the Italians fought particularly well, outdoing the Germans in line with them".[87] Rommel himself also conceded praise on several occasions.[nb 12] Other times, German mistakes were blamed on Italians,[91] or the Germans left the Italians in hopeless situations where failure was unavoidable.[nb 13] Questionable German advice, broken promises, and security lapses had direct consequences at Matapan, in the convoy war and North Africa.[93] Rommel often retreated leaving immobile infantry units exposed, withdrew German units to rest even though the Italians had also been in combat,[94] would deprive the Italians of their share of captured goods, ignore Italian intelligence, seldom acknowledge Italian successes and often resist formulation of joint strategy.[95] In addition, Italian 'cowardice' did not appear to be more prevalent than the level seen in any army, despite claims of wartime propaganda.[96] Ian Walker wrote: ....it is perhaps simplest to ask who is the most courageous in the following situations: the Italian carristi, who goes into battle in an obsolete M14 tank against superior enemy armour and anti-tank guns, knowing they can easily penetrate his flimsy protection at a range where his own small gun will have little effect;[nb 14] the German panzer soldier or British tanker who goes into battle in a Panzer IV Special or Sherman respectively against equivalent enemy opposition knowing that he can at least trade blows with them on equal terms; the British tanker who goes into battle in a Sherman against inferior Italian armour and anti-tank guns, knowing confidently that he can destroy them at ranges where they cannot touch him. It would seem clear that, in terms of their motto Ferrea Mole, Ferreo Cuore, the Italian carristi really had "iron hearts", even though as the war went on their "iron hulls" increasingly let them down.[98] The problems that stand out to the vast majority of historians, however, pertain to Italian strategy and equipment. Italy's equipment was not up to the standard of either the Allied or the German armies;[11] This argument is not supported by revisionist historians such as James Sadkovich, who argues that the quality of much Italian military equipment and armament was in fact comparable to that of the British and Germans.[99][100] An account of the defeat of the Italian 10th army noted that the incredibly poor quality of the Italian artillery shells saved many British soldiers' lives.[citation needed] The account by an Australian Battery Sergeant Major during the 10th Army's destruction: "The Italian artillery was definitely good at their trade. We were saved from serious casualties because of the amazingly poor quality of their projectiles, many failed to burst, and those that did were ineffective. The Italians fought their guns to the last, many were found dead in their gun emplacements. The Italian dead were everywhere. The guns were piled around with empty cases where men had fired to the very last. The Italians fought like hell at Nebeiwa."[citation needed] More crucially, they lacked suitable quantities of equipment of all kinds and their high command did not take necessary steps to plan for most eventualities.[101] This was compounded by Mussolini's assigning unqualified political favourites to key positions. Mussolini also dramatically overestimated the ability of the Italian military at times, sending them into situations where failure was likely, such as the invasion of Greece http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Italy_during_World_War_II (I know its only Wiki but its all cross-referenced very well and lists all the historians it quotes)
